Trump vs. FDR -- who was dumber?

President Trump foolishly thinks he has the ability to set the tariffs on imports from 200 countries. FDR thought he could set the price of gold each morning in 1933. Both flunked Economics 101.

Watching President Trump every day casually talking about what he was going to set the tariffs for China or Canada is beyond scary.

The more folks know about economics, which usually is about the same as how much folks know about quantum physics, the scarier it is.

Trump's daily tariff musings about major global economic decisions are a glaring example of why it is foolhardy and dangerous to give a president -- any president, even your tribe’s hero -- such imperial powers.

We can all mock or cry at Trump's certainty. We can scream bloody murder that he has no clue what he is doing and that his personal global trade war must end.

But what Trump is doing each morning ain't new. FDR used to do the same kind of insane thing every morning when he first took office -- he personally set the price of gold.

Few Americans -- and even fewer idolators of FDR -- know what he did so I asked my pal Grok to help out.

I asked:

In 1933 FDR called in gold and made it illegal for citizens to have more than $100 worth of gold. Then during the ensuing months -- and maybe years? - FDR and his treasury secretary used to set the world price of gold each morning. Can you describe in detail what FDR reportedly did to set the gold price and how long he did it.

Here is what Grok answered. I had to wait at least a whole second:

https://x.com/i/grok/share/dgIu2KcakomNsP1FeulQEprZS

Next, after that history lesson, I took Grok up on his suggestion to create a simulated meeting in FDR’s bedroom, where the president used to sit in his bed surrounded by some advisors and set the day's gold price.

The answer was this:

Scene: The White House, FDR’s Bedroom, October 28, 1933, 8:45 AM

The room is warmly lit by morning sun filtering through heavy curtains. Franklin D. Roosevelt, propped up on pillows in his four-poster bed, sips coffee from a porcelain cup. Papers and a notepad rest on a tray across his lap.

Around him, a small group of advisors huddles—Henry Morgenthau Jr., Treasury Secretary, stands stiffly near the bed; George F. Warren, the Cornell economist, clutches a sheaf of charts; and Jesse H. Jones, head of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, lounges in an armchair, a cigar unlit in his hand. The air smells of coffee and ink, with a faint trace of FDR’s cigarette smoke.

FDR: (grinning, waving a hand) Morning, gentlemen! Let’s not look so glum—it’s only the fate of the dollar we’re deciding. Henry, you first. What’s the RFC buying gold at today?

Morgenthau: (clearing his throat) Yesterday, Mr. President, we set it at $31.54 per ounce, up 18 cents from Wednesday. The market’s holding steady, but the farmers are still grumbling—corn’s barely budged at 45 cents a bushel.

FDR: (frowning slightly) Forty-five cents. That’s no good for Iowa. We need prices up—wheat, corn, cotton, the works. George, you keep saying gold’s the lever. What’s your number today?

Warren: (adjusting his glasses, voice earnest) Mr. President, my calculations show a clear correlation. Every 10-cent rise in gold lifts commodity prices by about 1%. Yesterday’s index—wheat, corn, hogs—was 62.3. To hit 65, we should push gold to $31.70, maybe $31.75.

FDR: (chuckling) Always a decimal point with you, George. I like precision, but the farmers don’t vote on your charts. Jesse, what’s the word from the banks? Can we nudge it higher without spooking Wall Street?

Jones: (leaning forward, voice gravelly) The bankers are twitchy, Franklin. They’re saying these daily jumps make the dollar look like a yo-yo. But the RFC’s got the funds—gold’s flowing in from London and Paris. I’d say we can go to $31.75, but don’t expect miracles overnight.

FDR: (tapping his pen on the tray, eyes twinkling) Miracles are my specialty, Jesse. Now, let’s have some fun with this. (pauses, smirking) How about… 21 cents? Three times seven. Lucky number, don’t you think?

Morgenthau: (blinking, hesitant) Twenty-one cents, sir? That’d put us at $31.75, same as George’s figure, but… why 21?

FDR: (laughing) Why not, Henry? It’s got a ring to it. Besides, if we keep inching up by dimes, the market’ll get bored. A little flair keeps ‘em guessing. George, does 21 cents fit your precious correlation?

Warren: (shuffling papers, nodding slowly) It’s within range, Mr. President. At $31.75, we’d be 53% above the old $20.67 standard. That should signal devaluation abroad—maybe weaken the dollar enough to get exports moving.

Jones: (raising an eyebrow) Signal’s one thing, Franklin, but the Brits are already sore about their pound. If we push too fast, they’ll scream we’re rigging the game.

FDR: (leaning back, exhaling smoke) Let ‘em scream. They’re not the ones with breadlines from New York to Nebraska. We’ve got to get money moving—factories humming, farmers selling. (pauses, scribbling a note) Alright, $31.75 it is. Henry, tell the RFC to buy at that price today. Announce it by noon—make it crisp, no hedging.

Morgenthau: (nodding, jotting in a notebook) Yes, sir. $31.75, effective immediately. I’ll cable the exchanges and get the press release out.

FDR: (grinning broadly) Good. And throw in a line about confidence in America’s future—something to cheer up the papers. (turns to Warren) George, keep those charts coming, but don’t expect me to read ‘em all. Jesse, make sure the RFC’s ready for a flood of gold tomorrow.

Jones: (standing, tucking the cigar in his pocket) We’re ready, Franklin. Just hope the farmers notice before the bankers start a riot.

Warren: (gathering his papers) I’ll have new figures tomorrow, Mr. President. We’re close to a breakthrough—I can feel it.

FDR: (waving them off) That’s the spirit. Now get out—I’ve got a speech to polish before Eleanor starts nagging me about lunch. Go make some history, gentlemen.

The group files out, Morgenthau murmuring instructions to an aide, Warren clutching his charts like a lifeline, and Jones shaking his head with a wry smile. FDR stubs out his cigarette, pulls a speech draft from the tray, and starts reading, humming softly to himself.

Historical Notes on the Simulation

Setting: FDR’s bedroom meetings were real, often held while he was still in bed, a habit reflecting his informal leadership style and physical limitations due to polio. Morgenthau’s diary mentions these sessions explicitly for gold price discussions.

Tone: FDR’s playful approach, like the “lucky number” quip, comes from a specific anecdote where he proposed a 21-cent increase for being “three times seven” (Morgenthau, November 1933). His humor often masked serious intent—here, to devalue the dollar gradually.

Participants: Morgenthau, Warren, and Jones were key players in the gold-buying program. Warren’s commodity-price theories drove much of the policy, though FDR tempered them with political instincts. Jones, as RFC head, managed the actual purchases.

Context: The October 28 date places this early in the program (started October 25), when prices were rising from $31.36 toward $32. The 21-cent jump to $31.75 is plausible, matching the program’s pattern of small daily hikes.

Dialogue: The talk of farmers, banks, and exports reflects 1933’s economic priorities—lifting agriculture out of deflation and boosting trade. FDR’s impatience with Wall Street and focus on “breadlines” echo his populist rhetoric.

Reflections

This simulation paints FDR as a mix of showman and strategist, using charm to steer a contentious policy. The bedroom setting underscores his ability to make monumental decisions feel intimate, even casual, which both empowered and unnerved his team.

Critics might argue this informality bordered on recklessness—setting global gold prices with a quip about luck isn’t exactly reassuring. Yet it worked, in a way: the dollar devalued, reserves grew, and confidence slowly returned, even if commodity prices lagged.

If you’d like me (Grok) to tweak the scene—say, add another advisor, focus on a specific date, or explore a “what-if” where FDR picks a wildly different price—let me know! Or I could tie this back to the gold-vs-DJIA chart, showing how 1933’s policies shaped those trends. What’s next?